The uncertain road to sustainable democracy: elite coalitions, citizen protests and the prospects of democracy in Central and Eastern Europe by Dimitrova, A.L.
Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at
https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=fjcs21
East European Politics
ISSN: 2159-9165 (Print) 2159-9173 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fjcs21
The uncertain road to sustainable democracy: elite
coalitions, citizen protests and the prospects of
democracy in Central and Eastern Europe
Antoaneta L. Dimitrova
To cite this article: Antoaneta L. Dimitrova (2018) The uncertain road to sustainable democracy:
elite coalitions, citizen protests and the prospects of democracy in Central and Eastern Europe,
East European Politics, 34:3, 257-275, DOI: 10.1080/21599165.2018.1491840
To link to this article:  https://doi.org/10.1080/21599165.2018.1491840
© 2018 The Author(s). Published by Informa
UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis
Group
Published online: 18 Jul 2018.
Submit your article to this journal 
Article views: 975
View Crossmark data
The uncertain road to sustainable democracy: elite coalitions,
citizen protests and the prospects of democracy in Central and
Eastern Europe
Antoaneta L. Dimitrova
Institute for Security and Global Aﬀairs, Leiden University, The Hague, Netherlands
ABSTRACT
This article proposes that to understand backsliding in Central and
Eastern Europe, we need a broad “Tillyian perspective”
emphasising elite–citizen interactions and the role of the state.
The article views backsliding as the outcome of processes of state
capture by rent-seeking elites united in party ideological or
network conﬁgurations. Simultaneously, citizen protests provide
an indication of (Tillyian) struggles for the growth of democracies
with a broader societal basis. As diﬀerent societal interests
emerge, some engage in a struggle against elite coalitions, while
others embrace conservative values. Based on this analysis,
sustainable democracy will depend on broad societal mobilisation
to defend democratic principles.
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Introduction
More than quarter of a century since the start of post-communist triple transformations
(Oﬀe 1991), a number of the democracies that have emerged in Central and Eastern
Europe (CEE) display fragile or deteriorating democratic institutions. Democracy is under
threat across the region, in “slow” reformers such as Bulgaria and Romania, but even
more so in countries such as Hungary and Poland, long considered to have reached demo-
cratic consolidation. A draft report by European Parliament Rapporteur Sargentini pre-
sented in April 2018 stated that “there is a systemic threat to democracy, the rule of
law and fundamental rights in Hungary” (European Parliament 2018). Similarly, a formal
reasoned opinion by the European Commission in December 2017 claimed that that
there is “a clear risk of a serious breach of the rule of law in Poland” (European Commission
2017). In recent months, Slovakia has been in the throes of a political scandal focusing on
fraud and grand corruption after the killing of the journalist investigating it, while Bulgaria
and Romania exhibit long-standing deﬁciencies of rule of law, undermining formal rules
on judicial independence (Dimitrov, Haralampiev, and Stoychev 2016; Sedelmeier 2014).
When executives systematically devise and implement measures, be they formal legis-
lative, organisational or informal, that enable them to dominate the institutions and
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organizational structures of the state, erode the balance of powers and increase their
control of the state and judiciary, this results in democratic backsliding. Thus deﬁned,
backsliding comes close to Bermeo’s (2016, 10–11) conceptualisation of “executive
aggrandizement” as a process “when elected executives weaken checks on executive
power one by one”. Examples of weakening checks and balances include the consti-
tutional and electoral law changes in Hungary between 2011 and 2012 (Bánkuti,
Halmai, and Scheppele 2012; Scheppele 2013; Sedelmeier 2014), reversals of anti-corrup-
tion measures in Romania or changing the prerogatives and composition of the Consti-
tutional Court in Poland (Ost 2016). Other, less visible, but no less harmful actions of
governing majorities have targeted and replaced members of the judiciary or controlled
the compositions of high judicial councils or constitutional courts. Therefore, in contrast
to Bermeo’s focus on backsliding through formal institutional changes “legally put in
motion by elected oﬃcials” (2016, 11), this article views backsliding as also including
the weakening of democratic and state institutions through informal rules and practices.1
Informal norms of regulation, staﬃng, and power balance in democratic and state insti-
tutions aﬀect the potential for robust competition as much as formal institutional pro-
visions do.2 Therefore, I view the systematic use of informal rules undermining
democratic institutions and rule of law as well as the introduction of formal policy
measures weakening democratic institutions as symptoms of the same underlying
malaise of democratic backsliding.
The question is, why do post-communist elites undermine the very democratic insti-
tutions they helped create? Studies of transitions in Central and Eastern Europe have,
for the most part, viewed them as engineered over a (relatively) short period of time,
by elites making choices formally establishing democratic institutions: adopting or amend-
ing constitutions, electoral systems, parliaments and (Constitutional) courts (Bunce 2003
Elster et al. 1998; Di Palma 1990; O’Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead 1986; Oﬀe 1991;
Reynolds 2005). Developments and choices taking place from the start of weakening of
authoritarian rule to the ﬁrst free elections were considered crucial for the shape of the
emerging regimes, making “immediate inﬂuences more important than historical con-
siderations” (Bunce 2003, 170). These transitions to democracy “from above” were in
some cases facilitated by the overlap between processes of democratisation and Europea-
nisation, that is, the process of preparation of post-communist candidate states to become
European Union (EU) members. The EU’s accession criteria were re-formulated to make
democracy an explicit condition for accession and programmes and benchmarks were
created to facilitate the building of democratic institutions. As 10 post-communist states
acceded to the EU in 2004 and 2007, with the EU’s explicit acceptance of their status as
full democracies, the end of “transition” appeared in sight.
The greater the success of “building democracy” from above appeared a decade ago,
especially given the highly unfavourable initial conditions (Oﬀe 1991), the harder it is to
accept the implications of democratic backsliding. The persistent erosion or capture of
key democratic and state institutions require us to question not only the democratic com-
mitment of current elites in CEE, but also our own understanding of transitions and demo-
cratisation. To start with, the term itself, “backsliding” is misleading, as it perpetuates an
overemphasis on institutional rules and organisational structures at the expense of
looking at political economic developments and mass-elite relations, as well as state
and societal contexts. While such an overemphasis on institutions was, arguably, inevitable
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in the early stages of post-communist transformations, in terms of both scholarly attention
and practical democracy promotion eﬀorts, nowadays it diverts attention from key trends
in political economy and society in CEE. Moreover, “back-sliding” as a term suggests func-
tioning democracies had already been established before erosion of rule of law or insti-
tutional changes brought a downward dynamic to this process. But is it possible that
broader elite-mass relations developed during the post-communist period have come
to be in tension and contradiction with the formal democratic rules adopted quickly
and relatively smoothly earlier?
I will argue that to understand better the relatively quick deterioration of political
regimes that appeared fully consolidated, we need to adjust and broaden our perspective
that has been excessively focused on the creation or organisational shape of formal pol-
itical institutions. A broader perspective needs to include political economy processes
whereby elites have captured post-communist states and continue to use and shape
state structures in order to facilitate rent seeking. A broader perspective also seeks to
understand the position of the citizens in states where elite-mass interactions have
been inﬂuenced by the historical processes of state capture – supporting and acquiescing
or protesting and mobilising.
A helpful starting point in adjusting our analytical focus is the distinction made by
Charles Tilly between democracy as emerging from struggle and maturation over centu-
ries and democracy as established over a relatively short term by the actions of “presi-
dents, priests, political patrons, planners, police chiefs, paratroop commanders, and
plutocrats” (Tilly 1995, 365). Tilly links timescale to agency and societal context, noticing
that the instrumental view of democracy as engineered by bargaining elites was funda-
mentally diﬀerent from previous perspectives on democracy as emerging from mass
mobilisations, and struggles of broad movements against elites making concessions to
popular demands (1995, 197). While Tilly concluded that “bottom up” emergence of
democracy as a product of societal processes and “shorter term, instrumental, top
down” building of democracy through the actions of elites were both viable pathways
for democratic creation, he emphasised the role of citizens and their protection from arbi-
trary state action in all democracies. By deﬁning democracies in terms of the interaction
between the state and citizens, Tilly’s work is an important reminder that institutions
are only meaningful if they reﬂect wider political and societal relationships.
State-society relations in CEE have been shaped by the elites engaged and involved
in transformation processes in the post-communist period. These processes, which
started with simultaneous transformation of the economies (privatisation), political insti-
tutions and (sometimes) nation-building and state-building (Oﬀe 1991), made state
capture by elite networks possible. Elite networks that have remained a feature of the pol-
itical landscape. The character of these elites and their political projects – of state capture,
joining the EU or both – should not be examined separately from the nature of the insti-
tutions and state organisation structures that they seek to inﬂuence. If we accept that
current political systems of CEE states are the product of political economic processes
that have empowered certain elites, then we need to focus on these processes and the
institutional structures elites favour. Therefore, an analytical focus on political elites and
the political economy on the one hand, and on the other, on citizens and their ability
to mobilise and defend democratic institutions would provide a diﬀerent perspective
on backsliding.
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This article will discuss the implications of a broader perspective focusing on the state
and elite-society relations for our understanding of the current state of democracy in CEE.
It will devote some attention in turn, to ﬁndings of the literature on state capture and citi-
zens and trends in support for democracy and mobilisation. Discussing diﬀerent manifes-
tations of backsliding – through institutional erosion or formal change – the article argues
that backsliding is not simply a period of bad institutional choices ushered by illiberal
populists. Instead, the possibility should be considered that systematic interactions
between governments linked to key economic interests, in power for several electoral
terms, and large constituencies depending on these economic interests, have led to the
emergence of a less democratic framework of governance.3 Drawing on some illustrative
examples, the article will sketch two types of de-democratisation based on the nature of
the dominant elite coalition capturing state structures of governance. Furthermore, the
article argues, the potential remedy for backsliding cannot be found in institutional adjust-
ments only, but in citizen mobilisation and the emergence of constituencies interested
and able to challenge the erosion of democratic principles. In this way, the article suggests
that a broad perspective can lead to a diﬀerent understanding of backsliding at present
and suggest directions for future debate and research.
A societal perspective on backsliding
Democracies by their very nature as systems of popular sovereignty rely not only on insti-
tutions as rules established by elites, but on participation, contestation, and maintaining of
rights throughout the whole of society. Even interpretations of transitions focusing on
narrow deﬁnitions of democracy stressing elections and constitutions, contain the implicit
expectation that once rules are established, citizens and societal groups would be
engaged with their reproduction and enabled or constrained by them (e.g. Linz and
Stepan 1996). The institution building that we have witnessed in the ﬁrst two post-com-
munist decades should, then, be seen as the initial stage in a longer historical process
whereby societies gradually catch up with the institutional rules established by elites.
As mentioned above, Tilly acknowledged that the rapid democratisation in post-com-
munist countries was elite driven and accepted it as successful in its own right (1995). But
he also emphasised that “diﬀerent institutional arrangements […] promote democracy
within diﬀerent sorts of social structure, hence that strictly institutional criteria of democ-
racy yield misleading conclusions on a large scale” (1995, 199). Instead, Tilly (1995) placed
citizenship at the very core of his conceptualisation of democracy, arguing that democra-
cies are deﬁned by the breadth of citizenship, the binding consultation with citizens on
governance (elections), the equality of citizens and their protection from arbitrary state
action. In such an interpretation, a democracy is not established when formal legal rules
exist that provide constitutional protection, but when elite-citizen relations operate – to
a considerable degree – in a way consistent with safeguarding these aspects of citizenship.
In another inspiring (if not uncontested) contribution, Tilly analysed the rise of democracy
in the West of Europe as a result of the organisational eﬀects of elite war-making (1987). In
that perspective, state-building was the result of elite projects of expansion (war making)
and citizen rights were created in a struggle to respond to taxation and conscription. This
struggle between elites and citizens also created and shaped the structures of the state
which emerged as a necessary organisational condition for war making. Tilly reasons
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that democracy is impossible without a strong and relatively centralised state, and that the
historical form and emergence of the state and citizenship even prior to democracy has
consequences for the form and functioning of democracy (1995, 203).
Analyses of post-communist transformations that focused on elite-mass relations noted
not only the leading role of elites, but also the creation of institutions of capitalism and
democracy with little contribution from citizens. As already discussed above, both demo-
cratisation and Europeanisation were driven by elites engaged in institution-building –
domestic and, to some extent, European ones. Transitions to democracy were assessed
by scholars as elite led, even if mass protests did play a role in their initial stages
(Bunce 2003). European integration and accession were also elite driven processes
(Grabbe 2001). The leading role of elites was likely inevitable, given the atomised state
of citizenry in the authoritarian or totalitarian setting of communism (Oﬀe 1991). At the
same time, citizens were exposed to long term transformations accompanied with
serious economic hardship and a decline in welfare and social protection. Claus Oﬀe’s
(1991) early analysis of the post-communist transitions stressed the patience needed by
citizens of societies undergoing economic hardships simultaneously with political and sta-
tehood transformations. Furthermore, Oﬀe (1991) and Elster et al. (1998) stressed that the
simultaneous transition to democracy and market economy meant that the lack of demo-
cratic rights and formed interests prevented parts of society from organising and (poten-
tially) contesting aspects of the transformations (1998, 306). In other words, in the absence
of clear interests and social mobilisation, many rules and institutions could be established
quickly and relatively uncontested by citizens. The very establishment of successful and
growing capitalist economies and pluralist political systems, in the decades that followed,
however, means that citizens in CEE are currently in a position to reject some aspects of
the past reforms, even if the remedies oﬀered instead are often of a populist kind.
Following a “Tillyan” understanding of democracy as the product of elite-society
relations in which the state and the resources it concentrates play a major role, we
need to explore a number of questions: ﬁrst, what kind of elites have come to power
after more than two decades of post communism and how do they interact with the
state and democratic institutions? Second, what kind of elite-society relations resulted
from these interactions? Following the logic of Tilly’s historical transformations through
citizen mobilisation, we also have to ask the question whether the election of govern-
ments promising more social support in CEE is not a consequence of the expression of
(diﬀerent) societal interests. Furthermore, given the emergence of predatory rent
seeking elites, are some constituencies mobilising to protect democratic rights?4
In the early 2000s, a growing group of studies emerged that addressed some of these
questions by shedding light on the interactions between the state and post-communist
elites. Some explored the role of post-communist elites in capturing and using state
resources (Hellman 1998; Volkov 2002; Ganev 2005, 2007), others the exploitation and poli-
ticisation of the state by political incumbents (Grzymała-Busse 2007) and others yet the
link between political parties, business elites and erosion of democracy (Kopecký and
Spirova 2011; Innes 2014). Consequently, our understanding of what happened to the
state in a post-communist context is more advanced than it was some decades ago.
The insights of such studies can enhance our understanding of processes underpinning
democratic backsliding. At the same time, what has not been explored is whether econ-
omic growth and the European economic assistance that all CEE states have beneﬁtted
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from the last decade have supported further entrenchment of rent seeking elites or helped
the emergence of constituencies mobilising for their democratic rights.
The next section will explore in some more depth how perspectives on the importance
of state capture and state exploitation can be illuminating for understanding backsliding.
State capture, dominant coalitions and backsliding
State capacity and state resources are aspects which have played a more important role in
post-communist transitions than many initially envisaged (Grzymala-Busse and Luong
2002; Ganev 2005, 2007). The ﬁrst generation of studies of post-communist transitions
to democracy neglected the interplay of state transformation (in terms of both assets
and capacity) and political transitions. There was little “productive dialogue” with those
studying the state (Grzymala-Busse and Luong 2002, 529). The trend was broken by a
set of studies investigating the role of elites and changes to the state as a dependent vari-
able (Grzymala-Busse 2003, 2007; O’Dwyer 2004, 2006; Ganev 2007).
Several scholars explored the role of parties and party systems as causes or determi-
nants of patronage and state exploitation (Grzymala-Busse 2003, 2007, 2008; O’Dwyer
2006). Most of these analyses depict the struggle to shape and control state institutions
as a transitional phenomenon. Other analyses have attempted to address the question
of how and through what mechanisms patterns of state exploitation might continue
(Innes 2014). Innes analysed such processes in Central Europe, focusing speciﬁcally on
Poland and the Czech Republic. Her analysis diﬀerentiated pathways of state capture
via strong ruling parties (e.g. Poland) versus state capture of parties/political systems by
corrupt elite networks (Czech Republic). In Innes’s view, state capture today is driven by
populist parties, competing for lower income voter support in conditions in which redis-
tributive programmes have been diﬃcult.5 A common feature of such parties is that they
established themselves by “monopolizing and asset stripping” the state for resources and
information (Innes 2014, 93).
The concept of state capture goes back to the work of Hellman (1998) and Hellman,
Jones, and Kaufman (2000). Hellman found that a state of partial reform is highly advan-
tageous for the early winners from the ﬁrst steps in reform, who receive rents and have
incentives to keep further reforms from taking place. This insight, I would argue, applies
not only to institutions regulating the economy, but also to political institutions. Consider-
ing the post-communist pathways of Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia or Serbia, to mention but
a few, the slow pace of reform could be viewed as a result of persistent “partial reform
equilibria” in Hellman’s insightful term (1998). In addition, as time passed and despite
the end of privatisation, political elites that beneﬁtted from access to state institutions
created new parties as described by Innes (2014) and continued using state resources
to stay in power. By capturing state institutions and resources and employing them for
electoral gain, political elites across the region weaken democratic institutions: in formal
or informal ways. The similarity of the phenomena studied by these diﬀerent streams of
work suggests common underlying causes.
Taking Tilly’s insights on elites’ historical project into the post-communist context,
Ganev argued that instead of war-making and bureaucracy-building, post-communist
elites engaged in plundering the resources concentrated in the communist state.6 He
suggested that predatory elites preyed on the wealth accumulated in the state domain
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and at the same time weakened the state structures of the newly emerging democracies.
Manipulation of resources within the existing structures of the state was made possible by
privatisation (Ganev 2005, 435).
While the logic of such elite interactions with the state can be transferred into a period
when privatisation and its gains have become a thing of the past, we need to ask our-
selves, what resources could dominant elites draw on once the available ones were
already “distributed”? Elites operating in a setting where no ready-made resources
could be appropriated would need to focus on other resources and potentially change
the institutional structures of the state to strengthen their role. In other words, the plun-
dering of privatisation resources would need to transform to forms of systematic capture
of the resources of the state.
Emerging systematic patterns of state capture would be consistent with the framework
developed by North, Wallis, and Weingast (2009) which distinguishes between natural
states, in which dominant rent seeking elites control access to services and organizations
and open access orders that provide universal access. North, Wallis, and Weingast (2009)
argue that while economic and political systems are independent of each other in open
access orders, they are interlinked in natural states. This integrated political economic
approach suggests a diﬀerent conceptualisation of state capture: not as a relatively
superﬁcial problem with institutional arrangements (solvable by introducing speciﬁc
formal rules to combat corruption or strengthen the judiciary), but rather as the conse-
quence of the dominance of rent-seeking elites on state structures and the merging of pol-
itical and business interests. North, Wallis, and Weingast (2009) suggest that in many cases
the dominance of rent seekers is embedded in stable societal equilibria.
The emergence of dominant rent seeking coalitions in the sense used by North,
Wallis, and Weingast (2009) could be linked to the ﬁrst decades after the fall of com-
munism and to the parallel unfolding of the processes of privatisation and establishment
of democratic rules. State capture not only weakened the new democracies in material
and institutional terms, but it also contributed to the emergence of networks of busi-
nessmen and politicians that formed dominant coalitions. These dominant coalitions
have not necessarily remained the same – much was made of the role of the former
communists in taking national assets by parties that succeeded them such as Fidesz
in Hungary and Law and Justice (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość, PiS) in Poland – but the
societal, political and economic relations that were established around rent seeking
may be a persistent phenomenon.
Today, the process of capturing and using state resources and democratic institutions
for private gain ﬁnds expression in high levels of corruption, but goes beyond it in scope
and eﬀect. State capture subverts the very fabric of young democracies, undermining both
input legitimacy (political representation) and output legitimacy (eﬀective public policies/
universal provision of public goods) (Tudoroiu 2015). By subverting and using key insti-
tutions such as the judiciary, administrative or regulatory agencies, and parliaments, net-
works uniting politicians and businessmen create a permanent coalition of power, which
aﬀects both public resources and democratic accountability. Challenges to dominant
coalitions through electoral mobilisation, for example in Poland or Hungary, have been
met with formal institutional changes limiting pluralism, in the cases that we associate
with backsliding. In other cases, such as for example Bulgaria, dominant coalitions
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may be spread among all political parties and therefore not challenged when elections
take place.
Mungiu-Pippidi’s (2015) theoretically informed and extensive work on corruption has
taken the focus on dominant coalitions further. According to her conceptualisation of
competitive particularist regimes, these are regimes where rent seeking is common and
social allocation is particularistic and unfair. Elections have replaced power grabbing,
but voters may sell their votes in exchange for participation in informal client patron net-
works or jobs. Despite the importance of modes of allocation for democratic institutions,
she cautions that democratic political institutions and governance contexts (particularism,
patrimonialism, or universalism) are not necessarily equivalent or in sync with each other.
Countries could have stable political institutions, but high levels of particularism or
patronage.
Reviewing developments in Bulgaria and Romania after their accession to the EU,
Ganev (2014) also highlighted the impact of competitive rent-seeking in eroding demo-
cratic institutions. State institutions are used – and abused – by networks (often involving
family ties) interested in their own enrichment. And the elites involved undermine or dis-
mantle democratic institutions such as strong independent judiciaries or anti-corruption
bodies when they represent a real constraint on rent-seeking.
Building on these insights and the work by Vachudova (2015) and Innes (2014), we
could diﬀerentiate types of backsliding regimes based on the character of the dominant
rent seeking coalition, distinguishing between: (1) a network-type dominant coalition, con-
sisting of businessmen and politicians formally belonging to diﬀerent parties or with con-
nections to several political forces; and (2) an ideological party-type dominant coalition
consisting of politicians from one political party in power and associated businessmen.
Examples of the former type would be Bulgaria and Romania whereas Hungary and poss-
ibly Poland would be the examples of the latter type.
Both types of elite-coalition state capture result in backsliding, as discussed above. In
both the role of dominant elite networks of rent-seekers is crucial, but their approach to
formal democratic institutions diﬀers. In the network-type cases, disregard of formal
rules has been the name of the game and the most serious symptom of backsliding is
weak rule of law, elite network controlling the composition of administrative and judicial
personnel and widespread use of informal rules. In the ideological party-type cases, formal
rules have been changed to concentrate and consolidate power and weaken formal
checks and balances, while also replacing and controlling administrative and judicial staﬀ.
An important caveat is in order here: next to the rise of dominant coalitions engaged in
state capture, we need to consider other signiﬁcant political and societal processes and
the elites that have been engaged in them. For CEE states that have become EU
members, the process of applying and preparing to join the EU has had a substantial trans-
formative impact on institutions, societies and economies (Börzel, Dimitrova, and Schim-
melfennig 2017; Bruszt and Langbein 2017). While privatisation created nearly ideal
conditions for state capture, accession to the EU may have constrained it, at least
during the pre-accession period when conditionality was strong and credible. Public
administration and civil service legislation adopted at the EU’s insistence (Dimitrova
2002) created (some) constraints for state capture. Civil service professionalisation,
which was greatly enhanced before accession, however, was often reversed after acces-
sion. Examples of legislative changes re-introducing political appointment and control
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over the service are the amendments to the Civil Service law in Slovakia in 2003 and 2006
(Meyer-Sahling 2011, 241–242). The eﬀects of conditionality, therefore, were limited to the
accession period (Sedelmeier 2008) or dependent on the domestic interplay of relevant
sectoral actors (Dimitrova 2010).
EU funding has also had a signiﬁcant impact on the political economies of CEE states,
although the debate about the overall eﬀect and direction of such funds is still open. Some
commentators suggest that in Hungary, for example, the inﬂux of EU funds may have
allowed elites to survive as stable dominant coalitions (Magyar 2016). One recent study
suggested that EU funds, as currently distributed in Hungary, support the existing equili-
brium and reinforce clientelist relationships instead of facilitating diversiﬁcation (Fazekas
et al. 2014).
What about the citizens?
The societal perspective highlighted at the start of this article suggests that democracies
should be seen as the product of the interaction between elites and citizens. In this per-
spective, not only state capture elites or European elites are important, but also the mobil-
isation or acquiescence of citizens and the possibility of societal resistance should also be
considered. A focus on citizens and their attitudes is also consistent with deﬁnitions of
democratic consolidation.7 Inspired again by Tilly, we have to ask whether state capture
and the erosion of institutions by governing elites have led to new state society relations,
whereby passive citizens accept less democracy or whether constituencies emerge that
are mobilising to defend democratic principles and institutions.
Citizens in CEE were demobilised for long periods during the transition, emerging from
atomised societies under communism and supporting transitions which were, by neces-
sity, elite-driven (Oﬀe 1991; Bunce 2003). This disinclination to organise and participate
in social action and civil society was an inevitable consequence of the all-powerful com-
munist state and the repressive regimes’ prohibition of political organisation or
mobilisation.
Despite their lack of active participation, however, citizens did have their own ideas
about democracy, and a variety of conceptions and expectations of what democratic gov-
ernance should look like (Dryzek and Holmes 2002). Ten years later, we might expect citi-
zens in CEE states to have further developed their perspectives on democracy inﬂuenced
by their experiences of the last decade, by the material interests that have emerged as well
as the interactions with elites.
Two countervailing trends can be highlighted at present, one suggesting low trust and
low interest in participation (in elections) and another, hinting at the emergence of con-
stituencies interested in defending democratic institutions, principles and values.
The ﬁrst trend can be discerned in recent polls and turnout results. A Pew analysis from
20178 shows support for democracy as the most preferred form of government at respect-
ively 47% and 48% in Poland and Hungary, lower in Bulgaria at 39%, 34% in Latvia and, in
Serbia, at a dismal 25%.9 Next to these worrying survey results, looking at voter turnout in
Central and Eastern European EU member states, a general trend of low participation can
be observed. This can be interpreted as a sign of “hollowing”, declining popular involve-
ment in democracy (Greskovits 2015). However, it is worth noting that turnout in Hungary,
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Slovakia and the Czech Republic has been higher than in Bulgaria, while Poland and
especially Romania show the lowest results (based on the latest elections) (Table 1).
These complex patterns of support and participation need further exploration and con-
textualisation. They can be related to the ideological versus network model of ruling elite-
led backsliding discussed in the previous section.10 Where elites are perceived to be part of
a broad rent-seeking coalition and no contestation and change through elections is
expected, turnout would be especially low – as shown by the examples of Bulgaria and
Romania. Where ideological discourses by political parties strengthen and feed societal
polarisation, turnout might be higher. The high turnout in the last Hungarian elections
is especially noteworthy. Factors including political ideology, nationalist, and xenophobic
rhetoric (Greskovits 2015), as well as the “pervasive overlap between state and ruling party
resources” (OSCE 2018) seem to have contributed to the high participation, while Fidesz’s
win of two thirds parliamentary majority has also beneﬁtted from the constitutional and
electoral system changes introduced by the party earlier.
Following Tilly, we should also explore whether some constituencies have mobilised to
defend democratic principles and contest the rule of predatory elites. This brings us to the
second trend manifested, on the one hand, in protests aiming to preserve or re-energise
democratic institutions and on the other, in the more active use of direct democracy tools
such as referendums.
In the last decade, we have witnessed mass protests across the CEE region against cor-
ruption and state capture, which show some remarkable similarities across the region,
seeking to strengthen and enforce democratic rules and defend democratic institutions.
In Bulgaria, 2013–2014 protests against the attempt to install media oligarch Peevski as
head of the secret service overseeing body condemned the persistent attempts of rent
seeking elites embodied by media oligrach Peevski to capture and exploit democratic
institutions. In Slovakia, two waves of mass protests targeted, ﬁrst, the improper use of
state wire-tapping powers between 2011 and 2012 (the “Gorilla” protests) and later, the
death of a journalist investigating links between politicians and economic entrepreneurs
(including, allegedly, Italian maﬁa) making improper use of EU funds. There have been also
mass anti-corruption protests in Romania in 2015, and between 2016 and 2018, defending
democratic institutions and separation of powers. Such protests should not be seen (only)
as evidence of the existence of state capture and corruption in these countries, but also of
the fact that substantial numbers of citizens are prepared to contest corrupt patterns of
governance and formulate clear demands for democratic improvement.11
Another illustration of the mobilisation of diﬀerent constituencies is provided by the
citizens and organisations using new possibilities for the initiation of referendums. Civil
Table 1. Turnout at two most recent parliamentary elections.
Country Most recent elections Previous (parliamentary) election
Bulgaria 54.07% (2017) 39.2% (2014)
Czech Republic 60.8% (2017) 59.5% (2013)
Hungary 69.3% (2018) 61.93% (2014)
Poland 50.92% (2015) 48.92% (2011)
Romania 39.5% (2016) 41.7% (2012)
Slovakia 59.72% (2016) 59.11% (2012)
Sources: OECD Civic engagement index, Bulgaria, Central electoral Commission (http://results.cik.bg/pi2017/rezultati/index.
html); Slovakia: (http://volbysr.sk/en/data01.html), RFE/RL Hungary.
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and religious organisations have proposed and organised referendums on the deﬁnition
of the family in Slovakia and Croatia. In Slovakia, a referendum on same-sex marriage
was initiated by religious organisations in 2015. Even though it failed to achieve its objec-
tive of outlawing same sex marriage because of the low turnout of 21.4%, it still rep-
resented a mobilisation of existing societal interests and attitudes. Similarly, a
referendum held in Croatia in 2013 proposed amending the constitution to deﬁne mar-
riage as only between a man and a woman, a proposition which was approved with
65.87% of the vote and a turnout of 37.9%.
Protests in Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, and Poland, on the one hand, and referendums
initiated by societal groups, on the other, should be seen as a sign of the emergence of a
variety of societal interests which are getting more politically active and able to organise
and mobilise (some) citizens. Democracies in the region may be becoming less elite-driven
and acquiring a wider societal base. At the end of the ﬁrst decade of post-communist tran-
sitions, in 1998, Elster et al. (1998, 306) argued that the presence of “coherent collective
interests, active and politically skilful minorities and a high degree of organisational articu-
lation” (then absent) would be a true sign of consolidation. However, they warned that
when economic and political structures are not ﬁt for socio-economic interest represen-
tation and mediation, they can easily “fall prey to a populist authoritarianism which
regards the complex web of democratic rules, procedures, institutions and attitudes as
an obstacle to an allegedly direct rule of the people” (1998, 307).12 The connection they
make between the lack of channels and opportunities for the representation of
diﬀerent societal interests and the emergence of populism is intriguing and certainly rel-
evant to developments we witness in CEE today.
The process of accepting democracy and giving institutions meaning through the use
of rules and diﬀerent democratic practices, however, is not an automatic one. Next to the
domestic political economy dynamics created by privatisation, accession to the EU and
post-accession economic integration also have had an impact on the formation of inter-
ests and attitudes. While rent-seeking elite interactions with citizens may perpetuate
and institutionalise patterns of clientelism and patronage networks, the integration of
CEE economies in European production chains and economic diversiﬁcation may create
conditions for the rise of middle-class professionals independent of such patronage net-
works. Such citizens and constituencies would be supportive of European integration as
a source of economic beneﬁts and may be sensitive to the link which the EU institutions
and member states are currently trying to reinforce between the functioning of demo-
cratic institutions and rule of law and EU funding.13 At the same time, exposure to globa-
lisation and European integration and variation in personal experiences with these
processes may lead other citizens to support domestic elites playing on nationalistic senti-
ments. The emergence of these diﬀerent elites and constituencies within open, European
economies creates tensions and supports diﬀerent, potentially interacting trends of demo-
cratisation or de-democratisation.
The trends and examples of citizen protests and mobilisation discussed in this section
provide some evidence that elites and citizens in CEE may be coming to terms with
democracy in very diﬀerent ways. However, the (potential) eﬀect of broadening the
social base of democratic regimes and the emergence of more conscious and active citi-
zens in CEE is currently obscured and overshadowed by two factors: ﬁrst, the formal
changes being made by elites to constitutions and democratic institutions mentioned
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earlier, and second, the emergence of elite discourses that openly oppose liberal democ-
racy14 for the ﬁrst time since the end of communism. Remarkably, both Orbán in Hungary
and the leaders of PiS party in Poland have promoted discourses where their own party is
identiﬁed with “the nation” (Greskovits 2015; Ost 2016). Given the existence of discourses
on democracy seeking a uniﬁed public good already in the late 1990s (Dryzek and Holmes
2002), the success of parties promoting a uniﬁed national idea seems at least as predict-
able as the rise of liberal democratic parties.
From state capture to backsliding
What analytical leverage do we gain by explaining diﬀerent forms of backsliding in
Hungary and Poland or Bulgaria and Romania in terms of the interactions of dominant
rent-seeking elite networks on the one hand and broader and more diverse societal inter-
ests on the other? The reasoning which connects the state and its resources, rent-seeking
and citizen incentives to hold (or not hold) elites accountable also suggests that govern-
ance by rent-seeking coalitions damages democracy. There are several mechanisms
underpinning backsliding, conceptualised above as both formal institutional changes
increasing executive power and informal erosion of democratic institutions.
First, we should recognise that democratic institutions creating (horizontal) constraints
on dominant elites – be they constitutional courts, high judicial councils, professional civil
services, courts of auditors or media oversight bodies – have been targeted and wea-
kened. There are numerous examples from all CEE states of such weakening in the last
decade. In Hungary, for example, the electoral victory of Fidesz in the parliamentary elec-
tions of 2010 was followed by changes of personnel at all levels of the Hungarian admin-
istration, as high as Hungary’s the Permanent Representation to the European Union and
as “low” as head teachers and hospital directors (Kiss 2011). The personnel changes were
justiﬁed by the government with the need to get rid of communist elites in Hungary (e.g.
Navracsics 2011). A 2018 report from the Hungarian National Judicial Council details infor-
mal practices aﬀecting judicial appointments and political interference aﬀecting judicial
independence (Novak and Kingsley 2018). These extensive and systematic eﬀorts to
inﬂuence the staﬃng of state institutions provide an example how a ruling party consoli-
dates its capture of the state and its organisational resources and weakens existing checks
and balances.
Second, and following from the above, changes in formal institutions, even institutions
as important as constitutional courts (Ost 2016), should be seen as the symptoms rather
than the core of the problem. Dominant coalitions embedded not only in political but
also in economic networks command the power to control job opportunities and to
empower some emerging interests and suppress others. After some time and over
more than one electoral cycle, these patterns may lead to long lasting societal changes.
As Bálint Magyar has argued in the case of Hungary, the multitude of institutional and
legal changes set in motion by Viktor Orbán and Fidesz since 2010 have led to societal
changes and in particular the emergence of a new “middle” class dependent on state
jobs distributed by party patronage (Magyar 2016, 154–158). Societal changes may be pro-
ceeding in parallel with the use of various laws and policies constraining societal mobilis-
ation such as laws limiting the free operation and creation of non-governmental
organisations (NGOs).
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Third, if we focus on rent-seeking dominant elites, we also need to consider how and by
whom they are currently constrained: society-wide mechanisms are the most promising
means of opening up particularistic regimes (Mungiu-Pippidi 2015, 218–221). Mobilised
citizens and speciﬁc civil society initiatives are an important condition for resisting back-
sliding. The inclusion of civil society in donor or assistance programmes, facilitating the
registration and operation of NGOs and embedding public consultations in EU funding
mechanisms can boost pluralism. However, vertical mechanisms of accountability such
as civil associations or organisations are attacked or explicitly controlled to avoid their
acting as checks and balances and their (potential) mobilisation of citizens. Leaders in
backsliding regimes actively borrow from the “authoritarian toolbox” used in authoritarian
regimes such as President Lukashenka’s in Belarus, or more recently, Russia, by imposing
legal limits on NGO registration and operation. These recent developments can be wit-
nessed in a number of CEE states, for example Hungary, Poland, and Bulgaria. In addition,
sometimes eﬀorts have been directed also at the construction and spread of illiberal dis-
courses and ideas to support the rise and of illiberal civil society, as Greskovits (2015) has
shown in the case of Hungary.
Fourth, politicians or entrepreneurs that act as patrons in clientelist networks employ a
range of positive and negative strategies to secure voter loyalty during elections and
thereby maintain their own position in the institutions of governance. Depending on
the scope of practices such as vote buying or (economic) intimidation, the very foundation
of the electoral process can be compromised. An illustration is provided by a recent study
by Mares, Muntean, and Petrova (2016) studying the use of negative strategies such as
economic voter intimidation in Bulgaria and Romania. They ﬁnd that the level of economic
concentration in a locality aﬀects the opportunities for economic intimidation of voters,
while economic diversiﬁcation makes voter intimidation less likely.
Finally, beliefs and citizen trust in democracy are undermined, as also illustrated by the
recent polls mentioned above. When the state is controlled by a dominant network of
actors (political and business elites), other political actors and the public may perceive
the rules of the democratic game as compromised. Citizens may ﬁnd that informal rules
about access to the state and its decision-making and re-distributive powers override
formal democratic rules. If, moreover, there is a perception that the same elite group dic-
tates and controls resources and decisions even after several electoral changes of power,
then the very foundations of democracy’s institutionalised uncertainty are undermined.
Where citizens do not believe elections can lead to a change in elites and policies, democ-
racy is fundamentally weakened (Tilly 1995). We could also consider whether the rise of
populist anti-systemic politicians in some CEE states might be explained – to some
extent – with the dissonance between rent-seeking elites and dissatisﬁed citizens. The
resonance of some populist movements (although not nationalist ones) could be explored
in this light, even if the remedies they suggest are not in fact solutions to the elite-citizen
gap.
Conclusions
Analyses of the dynamics of CEE regimes from a political economy perspective do not con-
tradict accounts of backsliding that focus on the erosion of democracy through insti-
tutional or constitutional change. Rather the broader perspective presented in this
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article aims to focus attention on the importance of the underlying societal dynamics and
actor networks that make it possible for authoritarian leaders to change formal institutions
or informal rules. In particular, I argued that we should explore the systematic eﬀects that
state capture – as a project in which a substantial part of post-communist elites have
engaged – has on democracy and society. Focusing on state capture by elite coalitions
of party ideological (Hungary, Poland) or network composition (Bulgaria, Romania), this
article argued that the use of the state and its resources are a central mechanism support-
ing backsliding. Backsliding itself can take the form of reversal of formal checks and bal-
ances, including constitutional changes or the use of informal rules or practices
aﬀecting the staﬃng and functioning of key democratic and state institutions.
The article also argued that we should explore further how state organisational
resources are used for perpetration of political power and rent seeking. State capture is
a central phenomenon to be further studied and understood in order to understand back-
sliding. The persistence of dominant rent-seeking coalitions is detrimental to CEE democ-
racies in several diﬀerent ways: (a) by formally changing democratic institutions to
consolidate power; (b) by informally eroding staﬃng norms and democratic balance of
power principles; and (c) by eroding citizen trust in democracy and its ability to deliver
a diﬀerent set of elites and diﬀerent policies. Elite-mass interactions which perpetrate
and enable rent-seeking and patronage may have become part of state institutions and
become gradually accepted by citizens.
In this perspective, the extent to which dominant parties organisationally capture the
state and control access to resources such as jobs and economic opportunities is a
crucial factor aﬀecting the popularity and durability of backsliding regimes. Following
the political economy perspective, we can also expect that as long as broad constituencies
beneﬁt from economic growth linked to powerful domestic elites, their response to demo-
cratic backsliding in terms of electoral mobilisation will remain limited. Under conditions
of economic growth, we may expect the same elites to be returned to power, as evidenced
by the outcome of the Hungarian elections in 2018.
If we accept that strong dominant coalitions underpin both the “ideological” pattern of
Hungarian and Polish backsliding and network trajectories of backsliding such as those in
Bulgaria and Romania, the future of these democracies depends more on the mobilisation
of citizen constituencies – against dominant elite coalitions rather than formal strengthen-
ing of democratic rules.
Increasing waves of protests may indicate a hopeful trend, suggesting a broader
societal struggle to inﬂuence public policy and state agents (as in Tilly 2004). The illustra-
tive examples mentioned above suggest that there are several diﬀerent trends in mobil-
isation deserving further scholarly attention. Some are explicitly defending the
democratic institutions established in the last decades, while others promote conservative
values linked to religious beliefs. These overlapping trends that pull in diﬀerent directions
should make us cautious in interpreting protests as an unambiguous constraint to further
backsliding.
Taking evidence of state capture and mobilisation together, it can be argued that rather
than sliding back from a supposedly more developed state of democracy, CEE states are
experiencing an ongoing struggle between dominant coalitions engaged in state capture
on the one hand and a growing set of societal interests and actors struggling for rights and
access to the institutions of governance on the other.
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Paradoxically, such a view can be seen as cause for both a more pessimistic and opti-
mistic interpretation of the politics of “backsliding”. More pessimistic, because it claims
that citizens and civil society have not, up to now, succeeded in forcing post-communist
elites to ensure equal access to resources and institutions and relinquish their privileged
position exploiting the political and economic resources of the state. More optimistic,
because it interprets the current period of unrest and polarisation as a struggle to hold
elites to account through emerging mechanisms of popular mobilisation. In this case back-
sliding can be regarded as a “normal” facet of democratic development viewed from a
longer term “Tillyian” perspective. If democracy emerges, as Tilly has argued (2004, 9),
as the result of political struggle over the medium term rather than being established
quickly through constitutional and institutional arrangements, then not all is yet lost
in CEE.
Notes
1. Such informal rules and practices can be, for example, in Bulgaria, the staﬃng the High Judicial
Council with judges favourable to ruling party interests or the compromised random distri-
bution of court cases despite the existence of formal rules requiring such distribution.
Other examples of such practices can include politically motivated corruption prosecution
cases in Romania (see Dimitrov, Haralampiev, and Stoychev 2016). Measures taken by the Hun-
garian and Polish governments to send judges into early retirement are very similar in nature,
although often overlooked by comparison with more visible changes such as constitutional
amendments or laws. Therefore, formal and informal institutional changes are seen here as
part of the same processes.
2. For the link between staﬃng norms for state regulatory institutions and democratic compe-
tition, see Grzymała-Busse (2007), who showed that in the early years of transitions, robust
competition resulted in better observance of informal norms on staﬃng and power
balance. Conversely, less competition can be observed when these norms are violated.
3. See also Ganev (2005, 431).
4. Such questions have been asked before in studies of democratisation focused on socio-econ-
omic dynamics and the struggle of speciﬁc groups for rights, such as Barrington Moore (1966).
Then they were eclipsed by diﬀerent perspectives and the transition to democracy literature
exempliﬁed by the seminal volumes by O’Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead (1986), them-
selves inspired by Rustow (1970).
5. Innes saw such parties as ideologically unanchored, which may hold for parties in the Czech
Republic or Bulgaria, but not for the emerging illiberal or nationalist party discourses in
Hungary or Poland. She attributes the success of populism among poorer constituencies to
the lack of re-distribution and decline of left parties as a result of it, an argument worth revisit-
ing considering that Polish and Hungarian governments have introduced new redistributive
programmes.
6. While Ganev’s (2005) “reversed Tillyan perspective” investigated mostly the use of the state for
plundering of existing assets during the years of privatisation, he also hinted at future oppor-
tunities for elites to continue preying on the state.
7. In Linz and Stepan’s (1996, 5) classical deﬁnition a democracy is consolidated when, following
a change of formal rules, attitudes and habits have also changed and broad societal accep-
tance of the rules of the game over several electoral cycles has been reached. Consolidated
democracies should exhibit a broader and more lasting acceptance of democratic institutions
and of basic constitutional rules, matching expectations and behaviour.
8. The ﬁeldwork was done in June 2015-June 2016. See: http://www.pewforum.org/2017/05/10/
democracy-nationalism-and-pluralism/.
9. The statement respondents reacted to was: “Democracy is preferable to any other kind of
government” as opposed to “In some circumstances, a non-democratic government can be
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preferable”, the third option being “to someone like me, it does not matter what kind of gov-
ernment we have” (Pew Research Center 2017).
10. This proposition needs further exploration through a more rigorous research design and
empirical testing.
11. For an argument stressing the increasing levels of civil engagement linked to 2013 protests in
Romania, see Volintiru (2013). For appeals for better governance in Bulgarian protests, see
Dimitrova and Buzogány (2014) and Ganev (2014). We must note, however, that the higher
levels of citizen engagement, as we have also witnessed in the demonstrations in Hungary
in April-May 2017 triggered by the higher education law restricting the operation of the
Central European University, do not predict immediate improvements of elite practices or
manage to constrain backsliding. Indeed, as Ganev has noted in his analysis of the Bulgarian
protests of 2013–2014, the results of protests can also be “elite retrenchment and repudiation
of civic demands” (2014, 43).
12. A warning that has proven relevant and realistic two decades later, suggesting that the
societal mechanisms representing socio-economic interests identiﬁed by Elster et al. (1998)
are still absent or underdeveloped today.
13. EU membership is still supported by the majority of citizens in CEE states and support is stable
or even rising, also in countries that have exhibited substantial backsliding. In Poland, for
example, the most recent opinion poll survey by CBOS showed a record percentage of citizens
– 92% in favour of EU membership (Stone 2018).
14. An example of the latter is the speech made by Hungary’s Prime Minister Viktor Orbán in the
summer of 2014, which contained programmatic suggestions for following a (Russian) style
“sovereign democracy model” (Toth 2014).
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